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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ALLEN CARL RUSSELL,

:

Case No. 950033-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).

The supreme court had original

jurisdiction over this case, an appeal of a first degree felony,
see

Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2 (i), but the matter was transferred to

this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief
or in Addendum A:
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

Code Ann. § 76-6-103
Code Ann. § 76-6-404
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4)
Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1)
Const, art. I, § 7
Const, art. I, § 12
Const, art. I, § 24
Const, art. VIII, § 5
R. App. P. 11(e) (1)
4-201(1)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration
4-201(2)(H) of the Code of Judicial Administration
4-201(2)(I) of the Code of Judicial Administration
4-201(2) (K) (ii) of the Code of Judicial Administration
4-508 of the Code of Judicial Administration

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether, due to technical problems with the court

reporter's machinery, a new trial is required because there is
nothing more than a blank tape to reflect the entire voir dire
proceedings and appellate counsel is left with no means of
properly identifying and preparing issues relating to jury
selection?

(R 100-07) (issue preserved following court

reporter's admission that voir dire proceedings could not be
transcribed); Addendum B.

"Because the resolution of this case

depends entirely on questions of law, we accord no particular
deference to the rulings of the [lower] courts . . . on any of
the points presented."

Provo

City

Corp.

455, 456 (Utah 1989); State v. Petersen,

v.

Willden,

768 P.2d

810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah

1991) ("trial courts do not have discretion to misapply the
law").
2.

Is a harmless error analysis either (a) inapplicable

here because the threshold requirement of reviewability was not
met, or (b) incorrect under controlling authority which suggests
a contrary analysis.

Issue raised in Appellee's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Reversal.
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.

This is a

See citations

above.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-103, and theft, a third degree felony, in
2

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404, in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Robert L. Newey on temporary appointment, presiding.

(R 89-90;

97-98).
A court reporter was not present during the proceedings.
Instead, the proceedings were recorded by videotape.

(R 32) .

The record contains a Videotape Record Log of Proceedings, but no
minute entry for each of the three days of trial.

(R 32-33, 36-

38) .
Missing from the record is at least one hour and forty-five
minutes of the on-the-record videotaped proceedings.

(R 32).

The log and the person responsible for transcription both reveal
that the entire voir dire was not recorded.

(R 32).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 17, 1994, at approximately 7:15 a.m., smoke was seen
coming out of a Skipper's restaurant on Redwood Road.
132).

(R 129,

Fire investigators noticed that the drive-up window

remained open, (R 374) , even though the business should have been
closed.

(R 218).

The night before the fire, Jennie Reed, the "in-charge
closer" responsible for securing the building, believed that the
doors and windows had been locked.

(R 167-68).

was responsible for at least fifteen tasks and
forgotten to properly secure the premises.

Cf.

However, Jennie
she may have
(R 625-26) (she

wanted to close quickly in order to go out with a friend).
In addition, Jennie noted that the window was secured with
3

only one piece of wood instead of the usual two sticks.

(R 187) .

Since one piece was missing, one part of the window was more
susceptible to being opened than the other.

(R 187).

Such windows, when hit in the right spot, would pop open.
(R 245). According to Alan Meldrum, the manager of Skipper's,
while that popping had not yet happened to the Skipper's on
Redwood Road, it had "happened at a couple of [other] Skipper's."
(R 245).
Based on the assumption that Jennie did in fact properly set
the fire alarm and lock the safe, the State argued that the fire
was an "inside job".

(R 600). Jennie claimed to have deposited

approximately $1000 in the safe that night.

(R 173); (R 202)

($941.02 was determined to be missing).
Jennie Reed, Alan Meldrum, David Tippits, Becky VanDoran
McClain, Victoria Rondas, Allen Russell, and Angie Davis all had
access to the building key, the safe combination, and the alarm
code.

(R 208-09, 223); (R 180, 187-88, 191); (the combination

was known by "the manager, the assistant manager and . . . it's
not unusual for key hourly employees to be put into positions of
responsibility and have that information as well").
One set of building keys were shared and rotated among the
employees.

(R 224). The keys were suppose to be left in the

safe at night, but the State did not establish that the keys
still were in the safe at the time of the fire.

(R 226-27) .

The

State also did not prove that the keys had not been copied or
that the alarm code or safe combination had not been conveyed to
4

other parties.
Even though there was no motive shown for the arson, (R
597), Allen Russell was targeted.

Allen derived no benefits from

the insurance and the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting
bad feelings with the restaurant or its employees (or customers).
At or about the time of the fire, Allen was up in
Butterfield Canyon with Linda Martinez and her cousin, Jamie.
(R 487, 506-09).

During past outings at a bowling alley, Allen,

25, had noticed Linda and wanted to get to know her.

(R 506).

Because the attraction appeared to be mutual, Allen and Linda
agreed to go for a drive.

(R 506-07).

Jamie accompanied them.

(R 508). State investigator Murdock failed to check the bowling
alley to determine if the two girls could be located.

(R 589).

When Allen was asked about his activities that evening, he
did not disclose that he had been with Linda because she had an
warrant outstanding.

(R 524). Since Allen did not want Linda to

get in trouble, (R 525), he referred to somebody else instead of
Linda as an alibi.

(R 341, 525) .

The State's case centered on Allen Russell because they
believed that he was hiding something--which in fact he was at
first due to his wrongly held belief that he should protect
Linda.

(R 524-25).

Allen's misplaced intentions, however, were

perceived incorrectly as covering up for himself rather than for
her.
The State also emphasized his absence from work the day
before the fire when Allen was simply consoling a despondent
5

friend who had just lost his job.

(R 182, 500-01).

In light of

the fact that Allen already had wanted to pursue more education
and a different job at a lumber company, he spent some time with
his friend, Darin, instead of going to work.

(R 501-02) .

A security guard at a business in the vicinity of the
Skipper's restaurant indicated that a truck similar to one owned
by Darin was seen in the area before the fire.

(R 266, 268).

Darin had lent a truck to Allen who, in turn, drove it up to
Butterfield Canyon.

(R 507). The State, however, suggested that

the guard saw Darin's truck.
The guard only saw the truck for 15 to 3 0 seconds and he
"really wasn't paying attention" to the driver.

(R 273).

The

truck seen by the guard, however, did not have a "shell" on it
which distinguished it from Darin's truck.

(R 274). Moreover,

even if the cumbersome shell had been secured by removable nuts
and bolts, the State did not show how a person could singlehandedly lift, lower, and raise the awkward and heavy object
without damaging or marking it.

No other persons were charged

with the offense and other employees were subject to only minimal
inquiries by investigators.

(R 108); see, e.g. (R 175, 197,)

(Jennie Reed said she was sleeping; Floyd Oberg stated he was at
home; Alan Meldrum also claimed to be at home).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Absent a complete transcript of the voir dire proceedings,
defense counsel cannot provide Mr. Russell with his
constitutionally and statutorily based right to appeal.
6

Existing

authority requires that record transcripts, while they do not
have to be perfect, must be complete enough to allow for review.
This reviewability requirement allows counsel to properly raise
or identify appellate issues and the requirement has not been
complied with here.
The State's argument of harmless error need not be reached
in the case at bar because such an analysis only comes into play
after a threshold determination is made that the transcript is in
fact adequate enough to allow for appellate review.

Moreover,

controlling United States Supreme Court opinions suggest a result
contrary to a position which purports to require a showing of
prejudice.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE MISSING
TRANSCRIPTS AND THE INABILITY TO PROPERLY PRESENT
ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL
The parties do not dispute that the voir dire proceedings
were not transcribed.

According to the court reporter:

For the record, after search of the first day of trial
and having the clerks search the original archived
videotape, the requested jury voir dire has been found
to be an hour and 45 minutes of blank tape. I have
rec[ei]ved instructions from appellant to transcribe
what is on tape. I have also notified the AOC and
Mr. Jones, prosecutor, and Judge Newey of this event.
See State

v.

Russell,

Trial No. 941901057 ("Reporter's Transcript

Acknowledgement") (attached as Addendum B ) ;

(R 127). On remand

the parties attempted to reconstruct the missing proceeding, but
were unable to do so.

See State

v.
7

Russell,

Case No. 950033-CA,

Motion to Set Briefing Schedule, (Utah App. filed September 25,
1995).
As discussed below, a new trial is required due to the
absence of a complete record and the inability of counsel to
properly raise and identify issues relating to jury selection.
See State

v.

Taylor,

664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983); Utah Code Ann. §

77-1-6(1) (g) (providing for "the right to appeal in all cases11);
cf.

State

v.

Tuttie, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985) (construing the

right to appeal under Utah Const, art. I, § 12, and noting the
greater state constitutional approach under the due process
clause, Utah Const, art. I, § 7, and equal protection provision,
Utah Const, art. I, § 24); Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5; Draper
Washington,

372 U.S. 487 (1963); Hardy

v.

United

States,

v.

375 U.S.

277 (1964).x
1

Other supreme court opinions have noted that defendants
are entitled to a complete transcript or its functional
equivalent to pursue their appeals. See Britt
v. North
Carolina,
404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971); Williams
v. Oklahoma City,
395 U.S. 458
(1969); Gardiner
v. California,
393 U.S. 367, 369 (1969)
(rejecting contention that it is adequate to require appellant to
rely on memory); Roberts
v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967);
Eskridge
v. Washington
Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1958)
(per curiam); Griffin
v. Illinois,,
351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
Supportive decisions from other states include Ex
parte
Steen,
431 So.2d 1385 (Ala. 1983); State v. Hart, 514 P.2d 1243
(Ariz. 1973); State v. Madrid,
510 P.2d 50 (Ariz. App. 1973);
People
v. Serrato,
47 Cal. Rptr. 543 (Cal. App. 1965); People
v.
Killpack,
793 P.2d 642, 643 (Colo. App. 1990); Lucero v.
State,
564 So.2d 158 (Fla. App. 1990) (per curiam); Montford
v.
State,
298 S.E.2d 319, 321 (Ga. 1982); People v. Seals,
302 N.E.2d 701
(111. App. 1973); State v. Robinson,
387 So.2d 1143 (La. 1980);
Harshaw v. State,
436 A.2d 513, 515 (Md. 1981); State
v. Moore,
534 P.2d 1124 (N.M. 1975); People v. Hall,
608 N.Y.S.2d 403, 40405 (App. Div. 1994) (per curiam); Gibbs v. State,
214 P. 745
(Okla. Crim. App. 1928); Commonwealth
v. Shields,
383 A.2d 844,
846-47 (Pa. 1978); Elliott
v. State,
435 S.W.2d 812, 817 (Tenn.
8

State

v.

Taylor,

664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), directly

addresses the involved transcript issue.

In Taylor,

appellant

argued:
that the voir dire examination of potential jurors . . .
was inadequate both for a determination of actual bias
as a basis for dismissals for cause and for the
intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. He
further suggests . . . that numerous deficiencies in the
trial transcript make it impossible for this Court to
adequately review these threshold claims. We agree.
Taylor,

664 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added); see

also

id.

at 447

("In view of our holding that a new trial is required because of
our inability to review the appellant's claims about the voir
dire on an inadequate record, we need not address those claims in
any detail"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(1) (g) (providing for "the
right to appeal in all cases") .
Although in Taylor

the prospective juror's actual bias was

never conclusively established and the threshold claims of
inadequate voir dire remained unresolved, see

also

infra

note 2,

the supreme court agreed that the deficiencies in the record were
in and of themselves an appropriate basis for a new trial.
Taylor,

664 P.2d at 445.
This Court is similarly unable to review Mr. Russell's

claims about the voir dire because of the inadequate record.

See

Addendum B (wherein the court reporter noted that "the requested
jury voir dire has been found to be an hour and 45 minutes of
blank tape"); Draper

v.

Washington,

372 U.S. 487 (1963)

("By

1968); Seliger
v. State,
138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 1940);
State
v. Perry,
381 N.W.2d 609 (Wis. 1985); Bearpaw v. State,
803
P.2d 70, 77-79 (Wyo. 1990).
9

allowing the trial court to prevent petitioners from having
stenographic support or its equivalent for presentation of each
of their separate contentions to the appellate tribunal, the
State of Washington has denied them the rights assured them by
this Court's decisions . . . " ) ; Hardy

v. United

States,

375 U.S.

277, 282 (1964) ("We conclude that this counsel's duty cannot be
discharged unless he has a transcript of the testimony and
evidence presented by the defendant and also the court's charge
to the jury, as well as the testimony and evidence presented by
the prosecution").
Indeed, the complete absence of a voir dire transcript makes
Mr. Russell's case especially compelling because the reversal in
Taylor

occurred even though a partial transcript still was

available for review.

Compare

Addendum B, with

664 P.2d at 445-

47. 2
2

In State v. Taylor,
664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), the juror
in question, Ms. Linford, indicated that she "would try" to be
fair and impartial in a trial which involved pornographic
material. Id. at 447. No actual bias was reflected in Linford's
recorded voir dire although her inaudible or omitted responses
were subject to clarification. For example:
THE COURT: . . .
Do you think you could be completely fair
and impartial, after hearing and viewing the evidence,
listening to the law, render a verdict concerning the case?
MRS. LINFORD: (Due to a continuing background noise, it is
impossible to hear her response.)
THE COURT: Well, that's what we're asking. I know that the
thought might be discomforting to some of you. As I've
mentioned, there's many cases that are discomforting to
juries.
Now, the question is, could you do it and be completely
fair and impartial as it involves the charge, the evidence
and the laws the Court will state to you?
10

State v.

Menzies,

845 P.2d 220, 228 (Utah 1992) (Menzies

is consistent with Taylor.

In Menzies

I)

T, Menzies challenged a

trial court ruling which required him to show that "transcription
errors prejudiced [his] appeal".

845 P.2d at 228.

The supreme court acknowledged some errors, but its ability
to review the record was unhampered.

"[W]hile it is true that

the record contains transcription errors, the mere existence of
such errors does not mandate a new trial."

Id.

at 228.

"The

errors [were] obvious in nature and reconcilable when viewed in
the context of the relevant passage or by referring to
documentary evidence, and none have any bearing upon issues
raised on appeal.

Furthermore, it is possible to cure any

conceivably prejudicial errors without retrying the case."
at 229; cf.

id.

at 233 (unlike in the case at bar, in

MRS. LINFORD:
THE COURT:

Taylor,

(Inaudible response).

Do you think you could be fair and impartial?

MRS. LINFORD:
THE COURT:

Id.

(Inaudible response).

All right.

664 P.2d at 445-46.

The district court, which reviewed the Taylor
case after it
had been tried in circuit court, "observed that 'the [circuit]
court must have been satisfied that her [juror Linford's] answers
were sufficiently affirmative to leave her on the panel.'" 664
P.2d at 447. The district court denied Mr. Taylor's motion for a
new trial and it affirmed Taylor's circuit court conviction.
Id.
at 440, 447. On appeal to the supreme court, however, the high
court refused to assume the content of juror Linford's answers.
Id. at 447. Further, as stated above, the inadequacy of the
transcript on voir dire--standing alone--provided the grounds for
a new trial. Id.;
Draper v. Washington,
372 U.S. 487 (1963).
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Menzies

I appellant "did not object to any juror on any basis

related to the missing testimony").
In Mr. Russell's appeal, the 1 hour and 45 minute blank tape
may not be "reconciled" or "cured".

The State does not dispute

that during Mr. Russell's aggravated arson trial, he challenged
for cause a prospective juror whose "parents may have been the
victims of arson when some of their property was destroyed by
fire."

Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion

for Summary Reversal", pages 3-4.

However, since the complete

lack of transcript here has "prejudice[d] [Russell's] ability to
raise or identify" his issue relating to voir dire, a new trial
is required.

See Taylor,

664 P.2d at 445-47; cf.

Menzies

I,

845

P.2d at 241 ("absent an indication that errors prejudice his
ability to raise or identify appellate issues, the existence of
transcription errors alone does not justify a new trial").
The above principles are consistent with the rules governing
court reporters and the appellate process.3

Electronically

3

State
v. Henry Lee Rudolph,
Case No. 950057 (Utah
September 2, 1995), is also consistent with the above discussion.
In Rudolph,
the supreme court ordered, "Because significant
portions of the transcript are missing due to technical problems
experienced by the court reporters' machinery, the Court, on
motion of the defendant, vacates the conviction and remands the
matter for retrial." Id.
(supreme court order attached as
Addendum C ) .
"The court reporter [in Rudolph],
as a result of a change in
computer hardware, was unable to transcribe the voir dire portion
of the trial as well as one half day of trial, . . . "
Appellant
Rudolph's "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Summary Reversal, Motion to Suspend Time Limit, and
Motion for Stay", page 2 (filed August 23, 1995). Rudolph's
appeal challenged, inter alia, the lower court's removal of two
prospective jurors, see Rudolph Memorandum, page 6, although he
12

taped proceedings must be maintained for nine years or as long as
the case is "still pending or has been appealed".

Rule 4-

201(2)(K)(ii) of the Code of Judicial Administration.

"The

operator shall maintain a separate log of each recorded
proceeding . . . [and] file the original recording and log with
the clerk of the court as part of the official court record."
Rules 4-201(2) (H) & (I) of the Code of Judicial Administration.
Cf.

Rule 4-201(1)(A) of the Code of Judicial Administration (for

an unstated time period, "The official verbatim record of court
proceedings in the District Courts shall be maintained by the
neither proved nor argued that the other jurors ultimately
impanelled had been incompetent or biased. Nevertheless, the
high court reversed and a harmless error analysis was not
employed. See Addendum C.
The same type of situation exists here. Due to technical
mechanical problems, Mr. Russell's record contains 1 hour and 45
minutes of blank tape instead of the voir dire proceeding which
should be available for review. See State
v. Taylor,
664 P.2d
439 (Utah 1983).
Rudolph
is not necessarily relied upon because the above
Point stands on its own. Cf. Rule 4-508 of the Code of Judicial
Administration (unpublished opinions may not be used).
Alternatively, to the extent that the use of Rudolph violates the
rule, Mr. Russell challenges its application to this case for the
reasons set forth in other decisions. State
v. Gardiner,
814
P.2d 568, 570 n.l (Utah 1991) ("Given the paucity of precedent in
Utah, there seems little justification for their [unpublished
opinions] use here"); Paffel
v. Paffel,
732 P.2d 96, 104 (Utah
1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring) ("If a decision truly adds
nothing to the law, it should be disposed of from the bench or by
a short written order that may be informative to the parties but
to no one else"). The twist to the Paffel
statement is that here
the short written order of Rudolph,
which "adds nothing to the
law" of Taylor
and Menzies
I, was in fact informative to other
parties. Besides applying to the transcript issue, Rudolph
also
preempts and forecloses the State's anticipatory argument of
harmless error. As alluded to in Taylor
and Menzies
I, the
reviewability requirement must first be met before the harmless
error analysis is even considered.
13

official shorthand reporter assigned to serve each District
Judge, . . . " ) ; Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(1) (the rules of appellate
procedure do not directly set a date certain for transcribing
proceedings except to the extent that court reporters must
maintain the record at least through the period of appeal).

The

problem here is that the videotaped proceedings were not
maintained through the filing of his appeal.
Besides the inability of counsel to review the for cause
challenge of the prospective juror, appellate counsel is
similarly precluded from identifying and analyzing other
potential voir dire issues.

Without a transcript available for

independent review, there is no way to determine what the court,
counsel, or prospective juror did or did not do below.
v.

United

States,

See

Hardy

375 U.S. 277, 280 (1964) ("The right to notice

'plain errors or defects7 is illusory if no transcript is
available at least to one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case
after the trial is ended"); State

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208

(Utah 1993) (plain error occurs if an error exists, it should
have been obvious to the trial court, and it was harmful);
States

v.

Selva,

United

559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir. 1977) ("when a

defendant is represented on appeal by counsel not involved at
trial, counsel cannot reasonably be expected to show specific
prejudice"); Strickland

v.

Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

(actions or inactions by the attorney may constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel).

The blank tape of the voir dire

proceedings and the accompanying inability to review the entire
14

record requires an order vacating the conviction and remanding
the matter for a new trial.
POINT II
CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL FOR
STRUCTURAL ERRORS, SUCH AS THE IMPROPER EXCLUSION OF
PROSPECTIVE JURORS
Even though Mr. Russell's circumstances fit squarely under
Taylor,

see

Point I, the State argues that "the missing

transcript cannot affect the outcome of this case."

Appellee's

Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Reversal ("Memorandum in Opposition"), page 4.
State discounted the thrust of Taylor

However, the

which held "that a new

trial [was] required because of our inability to review the
appellant's claims about the voir dire", 664 P.2d at 447
(emphasis added), and instead, the State argued a lack of
prejudice.
A.

See Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition.

Taylor
CONTINUES TO GOVERN THE CASE AT BAR AND
ITS HOLDING IS CONSISTENT WITH RECENT AUTHORITY

The State's Memorandum in Opposition provides some
background and a summary of its claim of harmless error:
At issue is whether the trial court erred in denying
[Allen Russell's] challenge for cause to prospective
juror Scott Meredith (Appl. Docketing Statement, page
5 ) . During voir dire Mr. Meredith stated that his
parents may have been the victims of arson when some of
their property was destroyed by fire. [Although no
transcript is available, the State does not dispute
defendant's version of this fact.] Defense counsel made
a motion to strike Meredith for cause and the trial
judge denied the motion (Appl. Docketing Statement,
page 3 ) . Defense counsel used a peremptory strike to
remove Meredith from the jury (Jury List, Attached as
[Addendum E]). Meredith did not sit on the jury that
convicted defendant of aggravated arson and theft
15

(Id.).
As the juror in question did not sit on the jury,
defendant cannot show any prejudice from the trial
judge's denial of the motion to strike for cause. "To
prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to
remove a juror for cause, a petitioner must demonstrate
prejudice, viz.,
show that a member of the jury was
partial or incompetent." State
v. Menzies,
[889 P.2d
393] (Utah 1994) [Menzies
II] . Defendant does not
challenge any juror who actually sat.
Appellee's Memorandum in Opposition, pages 3-4 (footnote
included).
Contrary to the State's claims, however, Taylor

still

governs Mr. Russell's case and like-situations where, due to the
lack of transcript, the parties and the courts are both unable to
perform the threshold requirement of reviewing the claims.
Taylor,

664 P.2d at 445; see

Menzies

II

generally

Point I.

do little to detract from Taylor's

Menzies

I and

preliminary

requirement of reviewability by adequate transcript.4
4

The Menzies
I case opined that in Taylor
juror Linford's
"recorded answers illustrated prejudice", see Menzies
I, 845 P.2d
at 228, 232 (construing Taylor,
664 P.2d at 445-47), although a
careful reading of Taylor
reveals that Linford's responses only
required clarification or elaboration. Linford never expressed
an actual bias or an inability to be impartial. See Taylor,
664
P.2d at 445-47. Further, even if rehabilitation of juror Linford
was required, the ensuing colloquy does not necessarily signal
prejudice. See, e.g., State
v. Boyatt,
854 P.2d 550, 55- n.l
(Utah App. 1993) ("If a trial judge can formulate one question
that properly satisfied the trial judge that the jurors are
impartial, one is all that is required to successfully
rehabilitate potential bias"); cf. Taylor,
664 P.2d at 447 (the
basis for reversal in Taylor was the "inability to review the
appellant's claims about the voir dire"). More important, if
Taylor-type colloquies or such court attempts at clarification or
rehabilitation did in fact "illustrate prejudice", the Menzies
I
interpretation has implicitly overruled a string of cases in
which challenged jurors did not actually express bias but only a
Taylor-type of uncertainty and hesitation. See, e.g.,
State
v.
16

Importantly, the Menzies
the Menzies

II

opinion proceeded only after

I decision had determined that "The record is

adequate to provide Menzies with a full and fair review of any
claim relating to jury selection."
(Utah 1992); Menzies

II,

Menzies

I,

845 P.2d 220, 233

889 P.2d 393, 397 (Utah 1994) ("errors

in recording and transcribing [did not make] the record
inadequate for purposes of appellate review").
Taylor's

Consequently,

reviewability requirement remained undisturbed and the

State's reliance on the harmless error analysis of Menzies
inapposite to the case at bar.
Menzies

II

is

Unlike the blank tape here, the

transcript was in fact adequate for appellate review

despite its shortcomings.
Conversely, ij£ the Menzies
then the Menzies

II

transcript had been inadequate,

harmless error analysis could have applied

directly to the present case.

Indeed, if a harmless error

analysis alone would have sufficed, there would have been no need
to even determine the adequacy of the Menzies
Although Menzies

II

transcript.

required a showing of prejudice when

jurors are not removed for cause, 889 P.2d at 397-400, the
reviewability requirement was no longer at issue.
simply refused to assume, arguendo,
inadequate.

The Menzies

II

The Court

that the transcripts were

opinion did not proceed to the

harmless error analysis without first considering the
reviewability requirement of Taylor.

A transcript must be

Gotschall,
782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Woolley,
440, 445-45 (Utah App. 1991) (citing cases).
17

810 P.2d

adequate enough for appellate review before the harmless error
analysis of Menzies

II

comes into play.

Menzies
II WAS IMPROPERLY DECIDED BECAUSE IT
FAILED TO ADHERE TO CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW

B.

Aside from the above distinctions, the harmless error
analysis of Menzies

II

should not be followed here because it

failed to account for the contrary harmless error analysis from
controlling United States Supreme Court opinions.
Ohio,

499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson

500 U.S.
McCollum,
J.E.B.

505 U.S.

Concrete

v.

Co.,
v.

, 120 L.Ed.2d 33, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (1992);
ex rel.

(1994); Purkett

115 S.Ct.

Leesville

, 114 L.Ed.2d 660, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991); Georgia

v. Alabama

S.Ct.

v.

See Powers

T.B.,
v.

(1995); Arizona

511 U.S.

Elem,
v.

514 U.S.
Fulminante,

, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114
, 131 L.Ed.2d 834,
499 U.S. 279

(1991).5
Appellant recognizes that "[t]he Court of Appeals simply

5

In its brief, dated July 15, 1993, the State in
Menzies
II cited Ross v. Oklahoma,
487 U.S. 81 (1988), to support its
contention that Crawford
v. Manning,
542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975),
should be overruled. However, the State's briefed argument did
not include the Powers,
Edmonson,
McCollum,
Fulminante,
and
Vasquez
decisions. These cases were similarly omitted from the
Menzies
II reply brief, dated October 13, 1993, and in his
petition for rehearing, dated May 12, 1994. Cf. J.E.B.
v.
Alabama ex rel.
T.B.,
511 U.S.
, 128 L.Ed.2d 89, 114 S.Ct.
(1994) (decided on April 19, 1994). Thus, while the Utah Supreme
Court knew that it was departing from Utah precedent, the Court
may not have been aware of federal decisions since Ross which now
mandate a different result. Cf. Menzies
II,
889 P.2d at 399
("Because the briefs in Crawford
addressed the issue only
tangentially and never cited the Hopt line of cases, it seems
likely that Justice Ellett and the rest of the court did not even
realize that they were departing from well-established Utah
precedent").
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cannot overrule the law as announced by the highest court in the

Sentry

state,"

Investigations,

Inc.

v. Davis,

841 P.2d 732, 735

(Utah App. 1992), but, for preservation purposes and in the event
further appellate consideration of the harmless error analysis is
required, the contrary result suggested by the United States
Supreme Court should prevail.
In Menzies

II,

the Utah supreme court cited a purported

majority approach which "reject[ed] the notion that the loss of a
peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the
constitutional right to an impartial jury."
at 398 (quoting Ross

v.

Oklahoma,

Menzies

II,

889 P.2d

487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).

"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact
that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to
achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was
violated."
[JRoss, 487 U.S. at 88] (citing ffopt v.
Utah,
120 U.S. 430, 436 . . . (1887)). To prevail on a claim
of error based on the failure to remove a juror for
cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice,
viz.,
show that a member of the jury was partial or
incompetent. See id.,
487 U.S. at 89. . . We agree
with the State and overrule Crawford
[v. Manning,
542
P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)] and its progeny [which require
reversal whenever a party is compelled to exercise a
peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should
have been stricken for cause].
Menzies

II,

889 P.2d at 398.

The court in Menzies

II

was persuaded by the Ross

rationale

and the claimed majority approach which rejected the result of
Crawford.

However, in its attack on Crawford,

the Utah Supreme

Court overlooked recent United States Supreme Court decisions
which undercut the 1988 .Ross opinion and upheld in principle the

remedy of

Crawford.
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Powers And Its Progeny Have Not Required A Showing
Of Prejudice Or Juror Bias

1.

In Powers

v.

Ohio,

499 U.S. 400 (1991), the Court devoted

much attention to the concept of "injury-in-fact" and the harm
suffered when a prosecutor uses its peremptory challenges to
exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons solely on the
basis of race.

499 U.S. at 410-16.

The resulting "prejudice",

the Court found, does not necessarily have to be reflected by a
biased jury or through injury to the defendant.
Powers

Id.

focused instead on "whether a criminal defendant has

standing to raise the equal protection rights of a juror excluded
from service . . . "

Id.

at 410 (emphasis added).

Without

requiring a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the Court
concluded that the wrong to the jury system demanded reversal.
Importantly, petitioner Powers did not claim and the Court did
not determine that the selected jury had actually rendered a
biased or partial verdict.

Powers,

499 U.S. at 412-13.

For the case at bar, of particular import in Powers
dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia.

See Powers

v. Ohio,

is the
499

U.S. 400 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist,
C.J.).

Ross

v.

Oklahoma,

487 U.S. 81 (1988), was not cited in

Justice Scalia7s dissent, but his minority opinion still
attempted to continue Ross'

harmless error approach.

According

to Justice Scalia:
The sum and substance of the Court's lengthy analysis is
that, since a denial of equal protection to other people
occurred at the defendant's trial, though it did not
affect the fairness of that trial, the defendant must go
free. Even if I agreed that the exercise of peremptory
20

strikes constitutes unlawful discrimination (which I do
not), I would not understand why the release of a
convicted murderer who has not been harmed by those
strikes is an appropriate remedy.
Powers,

499 U.S. at 431 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis

added); cf.

id.

at 403 (where the majority opinion noted, "The

record does not indicate that race was somehow implicated in the
crime or the trial").
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dissent, the seven-person
majority in Powers concluded that the affront to the jury system
"casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process" and places
the fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt."
411) (citations omitted).
overruled

sub

silentio

In Edmonson

v.

In effect, the Powers

the Ross
Leesville

499 U.S. at
opinion

harmless error approach.
Concrete

Co.,

114 L.Ed.2d 660

(1991), the Court again declined to invoke a harmless error
analysis in a case challenging the composition of a jury.

The

litigant there (Edmonson) did not claim and the Court did not
hold that the jury ultimately impaneled had been biased.

Rather,

without determining whether Edmonson had been directly effected
by the otherwise appropriately impaneled jury, the Edmonson

Court

reversed and remanded the case to determine whether the opposing
party's use of peremptory challenges had improperly excluded
jurors on account of their race.
Interestingly, the Edmonson

114 L.Ed.2d at 680.
opinion cited Ross,

but relied

on it only for the statement that "there is no constitutional
obligation to allow them [peremptory challenges]."
L.Ed.2d at 673 (citing Ross

v.

Oklahoma,
21

Edmonson,

114

487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)).

The Edmonson

decision cited the very page and paragraph in

which is at issue here, Edmonson,
Ross,

114 L.Ed.2d at 673 (citing

487 U.S. at 88), yet instead of following the Ross

the Edmonson

Ross

holding,

decision ignored altogether the result of Ross.

114

L.Ed.2d at 680.
Georgia

v.

McCollum,

120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), continued the

holdings against improper juror selection.

Recognizing that a

jury impaneled through the use of discriminatory peremptory
strikes is harmed at the outset, the McCollum
criminal defendants, like civil litigants, see
L.Ed.2d at 680, and State prosecutors, see

Court held that
Edmonson,

Powers,

114

113 L.Ed.2d at

424, may not use their peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
fashion.

McCollum,

Edmonson,

the extension of Batson

120 L.Ed.2d at 51.

"As in Powers

and

in this context is designed to

remedy the harm done to the 'dignity of persons' and to the
'integrity of the court s./,f
Noteworthy in McCollum
Powers:

McCollum,

120 L.Ed. 2d at 44.

is the following quote taken from

"One of the goals of our jury system is 'to impress upon

the criminal defendant and the community as a whole that a
verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in accordance with
the law by persons who are fair.'"
(emphasis added) (quoting Powers,

McCollum,

120 L.Ed.2d at 45

499 U.S. at 413). As alluded

to above, however, this "fairness" language from Powers

did not

impact the decision to reverse even though Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion had argued that petitioner Powers' conviction
was in fact fair.

See 499 U.S. at 431 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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McCollum's

use of Powers'

"fairness" statement served as an

reminder that notwithstanding the "fairness" of the resulting
proceedings, the harm to the jury system is in and of itself
prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial.
J.E.B.

v.

Alabama

ex rel.

T.B.,

128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), is

another recent decision forbidding the improper use of peremptory
challenges.

On behalf of a mother of a minor child, the state of

Alabama filed a complaint for paternity and child support against
J.E.B.

The State "used 9 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove

male jurors . . . [and] [a]s a result, all the selected jurors
were female."

128 L.Ed.2d at 97.

"The jury found petitioner to

be the father of the child and the court entered an order
directing him to pay child support."

Id.

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.

"The

verdict will not be accepted or understood [as fair] if the jury
is chosen by unlawful means at the outset."
at 104 (quoting Powers,

499 U.S. at 413).

J.E.B.,

128 L.Ed.2d

In dissent, however,

Justice Scalia again advocated the harmless error approach of
-Ross:
Not only has petitioner, by implication of the Court's
own reasoning, suffered no harm, but the scientific
evidence presented at trial established petitioner's
paternity with 99.92% accuracy. Insofar as petitioner
is concerned, this is a case of harmless error if there
ever was one; a retrial will do nothing but divert the
State's judicial and prosecutorial resources, allowing
petitioner or some other malefactor to go free.
J.E.B.,

128 L.Ed.2d at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by

Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.J.)

(emphasis added).

The

Court certainly was aware of the dissent's harmless error
23

J.E.B.

argument, but the majority nonetheless declined to recognize such
a Ross-type

In short, the force and effect of

Ross

has been replaced by the automatic reversal result of Powers

and

of argument.

its progeny.
2.

Errors In Jury Selection Constitute "Structural
Errors" And Such Errors Require Automatic Reversal

Consistent with the teachings of Powers
the decision of Arizona
Fulminante,

v. Fulminante,

and its progeny is

499 U.S. 279 (1991).6

In

the Court concluded that "structural defects" are not

subject to a harmless error analysis because such a "defect
affect [s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather
than simply an error in the trial process itself [i.e. trial
errors]."

Id.

at 310.

Structural errors, like the improper

selection of a jury, "defy analysis by 'harmless-error" standards
[because] [t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end
is obviously affected. . ."
Powers,

Fulminante,

499 U.S. at 309-10;

see

499 U.S. at 412 ("The influence of the voir dire process

may persist through the whole course of the trial proceedings").
The Fulminante

opinion addressed the admissibility of a

coerced confession and whether the evidence was subject to a
harmless error analysis.

Although the justices differed in their

opinions as to whether the improperly admitted evidence required
reversal, the entire Court recognized that in a context similar
to the case at bar the harmless error analysis would not apply.
6

Arizona
v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279 (1991), was decided
on March 26, 1991. Six days later, on April, 1, 1991, the Court
issued Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
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Cases "not subject to harmless error [include] the . . . unlawful
exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand
jury[.]"

Fulminante,

499 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by

O'Conner, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia, J.J.) (citing Vasquez
Hillery,

474 U.S. 254 (1986); accord

Fulminante,

v.

499 U.S. at 295

(White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, J.J.) (citing Vasquez,

474 U.S. 254).

The present case requires the same result of reversal as
that required by Vasguez.

Errors committed during the grand jury

stage are considered just as inexcusable as errors committed
during the petit jury stage.

See Vasquez,

474 U.S. at 263

("Similarly, when a petit jury has been selected upon improper
criteria . . . , we have required reversal of the conviction
because the effect of the violation cannot be ascertained");
Batson

v.

Kentucky,

476 U.S. 79, 84 n.3 (1986) (citations

omitted) ("The basic principles prohibiting exclusion of persons
from participation in jury service on account of their race 'are
essentially the same for grand juries and for petit juries").
The dissent in Vasquez also raised the harmless error
analysis, but such an analysis was rejected there even though "A
petit jury [subsequently] found respondent guilty of that charge
beyond a reasonable doubt, in a trial the fairness of which is
unchallenged here."

Vasquez,

dissenting) (emphasis added).

474 U.S. at 467 (Powell, J.,
" [D]espite overwhelming evidence

of his [Hillery7s] guilt[,] [t]he error at the grand jury stage
struck at fundamental values of our society and 'undermine[d] the
25

structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and [was]
Vasquez,

not amenable to harmless-error review.'"

474 U.S. at

263-64.
The "structural integrity" language relied on in Vasquez
repeated in Fulminante

is of the same cloth as the "integrity of

the judicial process" language from Powers.
U.S. at 263-64; Fulminante,
411.

and

See

Vasquez,

499 U.S. at 295; Powers,

474

499 U.S. at

Jurors may not be improperly excluded even if no problems

exist with the jury actually selected.
The decisions of Powers

and its progeny (no harmless error

analysis for the improper exercise of peremptory challenges),
Fulminante

(new trial granted for structural errors such as jury

selection), and Vasquez

(automatic reversal for wrongful

exclusions of grand jurors), all support the Crawford

v.

Manning,

542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), decision and overrule in principle the
effect of Ross

v.

Oklahoma,

Although Ross
prejudice, viz.,

required a "defendant [to] demonstrate

show that a member of the jury was partial or

incompetent [,]" see
II,

487 U.S. 81 (1988).

Ross,

487 U.S. at 89, construed

in

Menzies

889 P.2d at 398, none of the jury trials in the

aforementioned cases required such a showing.
decision had relied on Ross,

Cf.

Menzies

II,

II

but it did so without the benefit of

briefing addressing Vasguez, Fulminante,
progeny.

The Menzies

and Powers

and its

889 P.2d at 399 ("Because the briefs in

Crawford

addressed the issue only tangentially and never cited

the Hopt

line of cases, it seems likely that Justice Ellett and
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the rest of the court did not even realize that they were
departing from well-established Utah precedent").
If Ross

still existed as governing law, in principle it

should have prohibited the analysis and the result in each of the
cases involving a jury trial.

For example, petitioner Powers, a

white man, argued only that the State had improperly used its
peremptory challenges to exclude black persons from the jury;
however, the jury which ultimately convicted Powers was not
accused of being partial or incompetent.

Under Ross,

however,

Powers should have had to both allege and demonstrate that a
seated juror was biased.

Powers did neither.

The dissent even

argued "that the exclusion of members of a particular race from a
jury does not produce an unfair jury, . . . "

Powers,

499 U.S. at

426-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Nevertheless, Ross-like

arguments were of no avail there since

the use of a peremptory challenge to wrongly exclude a juror was
"committed in open court at the outset of the proceedings."
Powers,

499 U.S. at 412.

The structural error required automatic

reversal.
In Edmonson,

a civil litigant argued that peremptory

challenges may not be used to exclude jurors on account of their
race.

"[F]airness of the proceedings" was again the prevailing

concern, but only in the context of jury selection.
at 678.

114 L.Ed.2d

Fairness of the proceedings in terms of the result

rendered by a otherwise appropriately chosen jury was not a focal
point.

Instead, the threat to the structure and to the jury
27

Id.

system was the emphasis.
McCollum

stemmed from a prosecutorial appeal which occurred

prior to trial.

The Court admonitions remained consistent,

though, in its protection of persons participating in the jury
system.

"Be it at the hands of the State or the defense, if a

court allows jurors to be excluded [improperly by peremptory
challenges directed at group bias, it could] undermine the very
foundation of our system of justice--our citizens' confidence in
it."

12 0 L.Ed.2d at 45.

The theme of structural integrity

resurfaced once more.
J.E.B.

reiterated the "structural" theme by forbidding

peremptory challenges on the basis of gender.

The injury to the

jury system is paramount, notwithstanding contentions that "this
is a case of harmless error if there ever was one [.]"

128

L.Ed.2d at 116 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Powers

and its progeny, and the overlapping requirement of

automatic reversal for structural errors, Fulminante,
310; Vasquez,

4 74 U.S. 254, have ignored Ross'

proof of prejudice.

Ross

no longer controls.

4 99 U.S. at

requirement of
Governing United

States Supreme Court opinions dictate a result contrary to the

one announced in Menzies
Whitehead,

II.

Cf.

Society

of Separationists

v.

870 P.2d 916, 940 (Utah 1993) ("The federal rulings

set the floor for federal constitutional protection which we must
respect in interpreting the scope of our own constitution's
provisions").

The Menzies

II

holding requiring proof of juror

bias or incompetence is not required.
28

CONCLUSION
Mr. Russell respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this *^

day of November, 1995.
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ADDENDUM A

76-6-103. Aggravated arson.
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the
offense is in the structure or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) l b appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him;
(c) l b testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) Tb have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses ii
his behalf;
(f) Tb a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or distric
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.

Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
(Added effective January 15, 1990.)

__^
.www*« v u appccu* xue unginai papers ana exhibits filed in the trial court, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index
prepared by the clerk of the trial court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute
the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk of
the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as
the record on appeal. Only those papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this
rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial
court shall securely fasten the record in a trial court case file, with collation in the following order:
(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(B) the docket sheet;
(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(D) all published depositions in chronological order; and
(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order.
(2) (A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of
the collated record with a sequential number using one series of
numerals for the entire record.
(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court,
the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions, and transcripts of the
supplemental record in the same order as the original record and
mark the bottom right corner of each page of the collated supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with the number next
following the number of the last page of the original record.
(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The
index shall contain a reference to the date on which the paper was filed in
the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the paper will
be found.
(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and
procedures for checking out the record after pagination for use by the
parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a
petition for writ of certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in
the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, shall comply
with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any
other action necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and
transmit the record. A single record shall be transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(1) Criminal cases. All of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the record on appeal.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and
the clerk of the appellate court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a
compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed
format within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with
the clerk of the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were otherwise recorded, the appellant flfmll request from a court
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the
Judicial Council a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties
approved by the appellate court, a person other than a certified court
transcriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate
court shall, upon request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers.
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations imposed on reporters by
these rules.
(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged
finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the
appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant nortiona

To establish the means of maintaining the official record of court proceedings in all courts of record.
To establish the manner of selection and operation of electronic devices.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Official shorthand reporters.
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the District
Courts shall be maintained by the official shorthand reporter assigned to
serve each District Judge, except that upon the request of a presiding
judge and the majority of judges in a multi-judge district, and subject to
the approval of the Council, the official record of any or all of the court
proceedings in a District Court may be maintained by a suitable electronic recording device approved by the Council in lieu of an official
shorthand reporter.
(B) The Administrative Office may contract with private shorthand
reporting firms for the purpose of maintaining the official verbatim
record of court proceedings. The contract shall provide for the contracting
firm to furnish reporters on an as needed basis upon notification to the
court executive of the need for such services and for payment to the firm
on a per diem basis.
(C) The duties, responsibilities, benefits and supervision of official
shorthand reporters employed by the judiciary shall be as provided for in
this Code.
(2) Electronic recording systems.
(A) The official verbatim record of court proceedings in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals, Juvenile Court, and Circuit Court and before
Court Commissioners shall be maintained by a suitable electronic recording system as approved by the Council.

(B) The Administrative Office shall periodically study the state of the
art of electronic audio, visual or combination audio and visual recording
technology and make recommendations to the Council of systems to be
approved.
(C) Other electronic recording equipment permitted in the courtroom
shall not be used to report the official record when the proceedings are
being recorded by the official electronic system approved by the Council.
(D) The original tape and accompanying log or official shorthand reporter's notes shall be retained as part of the official record of the court.
(E) Persons desiring a copy of the electronic recording tape shall make
written application to the clerk of the court designating the case title,
case number and tape number and make payment for the costs of duplication and postage. The judge may restrict distribution of copies of the
record and transcripts of any matter not held in open court or in any
matter determined by the judge to be inappropriate.
(F) The clerk of the court or designated deputy court clerk shall operate
the electronic recording system in the courtroom so as to accurately
record the proceedings before the court.
(G) The operator shall be adequately trained in the operation of the
system.
(H) The operator shall maintain a separate log of each recorded proceeding on a form containing essential information as approved by the
Administrative Office.
(I) The operator shall file the original recording and log with the clerk
of the court as part of the official court record. The recording shall be kept
in a secure area but need not be kept with the actual case file.
(J) Only the clerk of the court or designee may release the original
recording and log to the judge, or official court transcriber, or to the clerk
of an Appellate Court. The clerk shall record the name of the recipient
and when the recording and log were released and returned.
(K) Tapes may be recycled and reused after the following periods of
time have elapsed from the date of the last recording on the tape unless
any case on the tape is still pending or has been appealed or the court has
directed otherwise:
(i) circuit court civil matters and juvenile court matters, two years;
ftTIf?

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.

Sec. 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and other courts —
Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary
writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, shall be
provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme
Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original
jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause.

Sec. 9. [Appeals from district court—Prom justices' courts.]
From all final judgments of the district courts, there shall be a right
of appeal to the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon the record
made in the court below and under such regulations as may be provided
by law. In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and
fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals shall also lie from the final orders and decrees of the Court in the
administration of decedent estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall
be provided by law. Appeals shall also lie from the final judgment of
justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases to the District Courts on
both questions of law and fact, with such limitations and restrictions
as shall be provided by law; and the decision of the District Courts on

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of

ADDENDUM B

1

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

2

1
*

31
THE STATE OF UTAH,
41
Plaintiffs,
51
-vs61
7

*

*

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Trial No. 941901057
App. No. *

ALLEN CARL RUSSELL,
Defendants.

81
9
10
11
12

Date Transcript request received:
12-5-94
Satisfactory payment arranged:
YES
If yes,
12-5-94-94

13
14
15
CARLTON WAY, RPR CSR

16
17

12-5-94

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

cc:

LDA for Appellant
AG for Respondent

FOR THE RECORD, AFTER SEARCH OF THE FIRST DAY OF
TRIAL AND HAVING THE CLERKS SEARCH THE ORIGINAL
ARCHIVED VIDEOTAPE, THE REQUESTED JURY VOIR DIRE HAS
BEEN FOUND TO BE AN HOUR AND 4 5 MINUTES OF BLANK
TAPE. I HAVE RECIEVED INSTRUCTIONS
FROM APPELLANT
TO TRANSCRIBE WHAT IS ON TAPE. I HAVE ALSO NOTIFIED
THE AOC AND MR. JONES, PROSECUTOR, AND JUDGE NEWEY OF
THIS EVENT.

ADDENDUM C

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—00O00—

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Henry Lee Rudolph,
Defendant and Appellant.

No.

950057
941901206

—ooOoo—
ORDER

Because significant portions of the transcript are missing due to technical
problems experienced by the court reporters' machinery, the Court, on motion of the
defendant, vacates the conviction and remands the matter for retrial.

r/V/fr

Date/
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^^micha^HJi. Zimmerman
c

i

For the Court

